The One-Army reality

The project technique developed between USACC-WESTCOM and the 261st Signal Command in 1983 and refined in 1984 has worked well as a method for integrating an Army National Guard unit into operations in its theater of wartime responsibility, while at the same time generating real-world warplans and work for the unit.

by Maj. Reid K. Beveridge and Maj. Charles J. Anderson

The successful reserve component unit commander must make the maximum use of available training time each year. In most cases, this amounts to only 39 days a year, compared with approximately 250 days for an active Army unit. This limited training time is a continual source of frustration for the Guard and Reserve commander and the active Army commanders and officers who are associated with these units.

This article will describe some of the training management techniques and procedures used by the 261st Signal Command, Delaware Army National Guard, during its close and continuing association with the US Army Communications Command-Western Command (USACC-WESTCOM) over the past several years. The commanders of these two organizations have minimized frustrations and maximized training effectiveness using the principles of the Army CAPSTONE program and a relatively new technique called "incremental annual training."

The Army CAPSTONE program was implemented several years ago and has undergone refinement to reach its present stage of maturity. Active and Guard/Reserve commanders generally agree that CAPSTONE (which is not an acronym) has done more than almost any single thing to knit active and Guard/Reserve organizations together for training mobilization, and occasionally limited deployments. The successful consummation of these CAPSTONE relationships advances the One-Army into the final phase of the Total Force Policy as originally envisioned by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird when he proposed it in 1970.

illustration by Sp4 Raymond M. Fields, Sr.

Army doctrine governing CAPSTONE, AR 11-30, illustrates how this program is designed to improve wartime relationships and the training levels of the Army National Guard.

The CAPSTONE program establishes an organizational structure that will provide the following:

- Improved mobilization and wartime planning, mission capability, and deployability throughout the Total Army.
- The basis for developing peacetime planning and training associations; this will enable units to plan and, where feasible, train in peacetime with the organization they will operate with in wartime.
- Improved wartime mission-oriented training.
- Improved management of the Total Army by focusing actions taken under other programs on wartime mission accomplishments; these other programs include mutual support overseas deployment training and joint exercises.
- Improved readiness of the Total Army through the alignment of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC)[1] units to meet Total Army wartime requirements and the needs of the continental United States (CONUS) sustaining base, in harmony with Total Army Analysis (TAA).[2]

A number of good effects accrue from the CAPSTONE program. Perhaps the most important for the Guard/Reserve unit is that it makes specific and concrete what the unit's wartime mission is. It assigns that unit a wartime higher headquarters.

CAPSTONE assignments themselves are made periodically by the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) based on wartime requirements as defined by theater commanders-in-chief. As mentioned, the CONUS sustaining base also has CAPSTONE requirements and units assigned to wartime training and support missions. The vast majority of Guard/Reserve Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) units in the combat, combat support, and combat service support arenas have overseas CAPSTONE missions. However, as noted in AR 11-30, although these CAPSTONE assignments are made in peacetime with wartime requirements in mind, the CAPSTONE assignment itself does not change existing chain of command relationships. The US Army Reserve units still are commanded by FORSCOM through



the five CONUS armies. Army National Guard units are under state control in peacetime and therefore are commanded by their governors acting through state adjutants general.

Thus, AR 11-30 encourages informal CAPSTONE coordination between active Army gaining commands and Guard/Reserve units. It also indicates that planning associations should be implemented between the active and RC units and that the flow of wartime planning information will follow CAPSTONE channels rather than established peacetime channels. And finally, AR 11-30 says active Army personnel should visit their CAPSTONE units during inactive duty training (weekend drills) and annual training (AT).

Transition to Signal

During the years when CAPSTONE was being implemented, the 261st Signal Command of the Delaware Army National Guard had been undergoing the kind of training required after a change of branch and a major change in mission. Prior to 1969, most of the Delaware Army National Guard was air defense artillery, with an ADA brigade headquarters and subordinate battalions. After a major national reorganization of the Army Guard in 1967-68, the National Guard Bureau (the Department of the Army and Air Force executive agency for the Guard in peacetime) eliminated all the Guard's non-divisional air defense units, reorganizing them into other branches. National Guard Bureau leaders at the time selected Delaware for the new Signal command to be created in the force structure because of its high-technology manpower pool, principally at the E.I. du Pont manufacturing complex, but also because of its proximity to Fort Monmouth, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. Indeed, the 261st's headquarters in Dover has recruited a number of highly qualified personnel from telephone and computer firms from places outside Delaware that are within reasonable driving distance of Dover.

After being reorganized, the unit went to annual training at Fort Gordon the first year to learn the fundamentals of Signal at the US Army Signal School and to assist officers and enlisted personnel alike in their transition. In subsequent years, the unit and personnel from the US Army Communications Command (USACC) organized command post and field training exercises utilizing USACC assets so the Signal command could learn how to command and control large Signal units in an operational setting. Exercises Lever Action and Go Between Circuits were part of this effort.

Pacific CAPSTONE

At about the same time, the active Army decided to deactivate the 6th Signal Command at Fort Shafter, Hawaii. It had been the Signal command in the Pacific Theater since 1967, but with the end of the war in Vietnam, this headquarters was deemed non-essential. USACC set up separate units reporting directly to it to manage C-E matters for Hawaii and all other US Pacific islands, for Japan and for Korea. Enter the 261st.

Although the Army's decision about deactivation of the 6th Signal Command was justified due to the reduced activity in the Pacific Theater, what also was obvious was that if there were another outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific area, the need for a Signal command would reoccur. Thus, it became logical to make the 261st's CAPSTONE assignment to the US Army Western Command (WESTCOM), headquartered at Fort Shafter. So, beginning in the late 1970s, WESTCOM through its USACC office began working with the 261st to see how the CAPSTONE alignment could best be developed and used for accomplishing WESTCOM's mission of writing warplans for the Pacific and to help the 261st train for its wartime mission.

What WESTCOM and the 261st were doing together had its parallels in the rest of the Total Army, although other types of units frequently took different approaches. There are two ways most Guard and Reserve units go about this coordination and training. One, used infrequently, is to deploy the unit to its CAPSTONE theater of operations for its two-week AT period. However, since deploying large troop units is very expensive, only a few battalions a year can participate.

What is far more widely done, with several hundred units a year participating, is the deployment of a few key officers and NCOs from battalions and higher headquarters to their CAPSTONE units' locations overseas. This allows those key people to see their operational area, coordinate in detail with their CAPSTONE gaining command, and then go home and train their units based on their experiences.

The 261st-WESTCOM relationship and what the 261st is carrying over to its new CAPSTONE affiliation, Third US Army, is a combination of these two practices. However, what makes the 261st-WESTCOM program unique is that these arrangements are not merely for training or coordination—although this is done—but also to do real-world work. The staff actions and war planning are not responses to some set of mythical scenarios, but are work on plans urgently required by WESTCOM, and which have been

and will be incorporated into Pacific Theater warplans.

The 261st has pursued this course of action in large part because, as a one-of-a-kind organization in the Army National Guard, it was a bit different than most other two-star headquarters. This Delaware National Guard unit finds itself with a large staff of senior officers and enlisted personnel that logically fits such a unit, but no subordinate units. Yes, there are two Signal battalions in Delaware, but neither has a CAPSTONE relationship with the 261st.

Further, the 261st's subordinate units for both its Third Army (TUSA) and Pacific Theater missions are Signal brigades that have no peacetime command relationship with the 261st. They either are in the active Army or are Army Guard or US Army Reserve units located far from Delaware.

In beginning and developing its relationship with WESTCOM, the 261st's commander and senior staff have sought to train the unit in several areas. After successfully completing the CPXs and FTXs previously mentioned, it was determined that the unit's next goal should be to deploy its headquarters to its wartime area of operations. This was done through a Mobilization and Deployment Exercise (MODEX) authorized and funded by the National Guard Bureau as a way of deploying whole units to their CAPSTONE assignments.

The MODEX occurred in March 1982 when virtually the entire 261st assembled at the State Armory in Dover and then flew to Hawaii as a group. That year, the 261st was billeted in the "field," which meant in a tent city at a location called "Area X" at Schofield Barracks. A wooden building, since destroyed by a hurricane, was the headquarters' office.

Although the exercise was valuable from a mobilization and deployment point of view, the arrangement was not very practical for a theater-level headquarters. The physical location was too far from WESTCOM at Fort Shafter to permit satisfactory work accomplishment, and it severely degraded what the unit should do to accomplish its mission. So in 1983, rather than going to Hawaii as a 249-member unit, the 261st was divided into four increments of about 40 officers and enlisted personnel each. (Some support personnel conducted their AT at the state military camp in Delaware.)

According to Colonel Dennis C. Hall, ACC-WESTCOM commander:

By breaking the 261st into four groups, our people at ACC-WESTCOM were able to devote their attention to a manageable number of staff officers and NCOs. This also allowed high-quality work by the 261st's staff on the various projects that had been identified prior to the first increment. This utilization of personnel also allowed them to move right in beside my staff in our building at Fort Shafter.[3]



A key element in planning for these four increments and the 56 projects the various sections worked on over the two-month period was the appointment in 1982 of a liaison officer from the 261st to work full-time at ACC-WESTCOM. That individual—actually four different men during the first two years—works jointly for the two commanders, Major General William H. Duncan of the 261st and Colonel Hall. Recently, this tour—which at six months actually discouraged applicants—was upgraded to a three-year statutory tour that includes PCS moves to and from Hawaii. The current liaison officer is Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Mead, formerly a branch chief in the 261st's Plans Division. In civilian life, Mead is a computer systems designer for an Annapolis, Maryland, electronic engineering firm.

AT-83 planning

Probably the most important part of the liaison officer's job is the planning for AT periods of the 261st in Hawaii. There are several aspects to this, some of which were handled in Hawaii and others of which were accomplished in Delaware by the unit's full-time personnel.

Project identification: The first consideration was determining what work needed to be done and how it could be done. There is an important difference here between planning work for an active Army headquarters and for any Army Guard equivalent. In the active Army, a project probably will be rather open-ended in the sense that the personnel doing the work are presumed to be available to work on it for an indefinite period. Of course, suspense dates and deadlines may drive the speed and pace of the work.

However, in planning the 261st's AT-83, the liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis C. Rosenthal at that time, had to keep in mind what the reasonable productivity expectation was from an individual 261st staff member. If the project was larger in scope than the individual or group of individuals could reasonably be expected to complete in 10 or 11 working days, then the project would have to be scheduled over more than one increment, or designated as one to be taken home and finished in Dover.

The incremental system of scheduling AT-83 was another feature of that year's plan. AT-82, when virtually the entire unit had traveled together to Hawaii, taught the 261st and USACC-WESTCOM that breaking the unit into small groups was desirable. USACC-WESTCOM has only about 25 full-time C-E action officers, most of them DA civilians. If a one-on-one relationship and the fostering of good working association were the goals, then the 261st simply couldn't again overwhelm WESTCOM with too many bodies all at once.

The result was an AT-83 plan for dividing the staff sections into increments of about 40 each. Rosenthal and his successor as liaison officer, Major Dennis King, then developed—in coordination with USACC-WESTCOM's Plans and Operations Division—a total of 56 projects for the two-month AT-83 period, which began in late May and ended in July. Several of the projects will be discussed below.

Personnel: After the 56 projects for AT-83 were identified and defined, the senior staff of the 261st had to divide the unit personnel, particularly the officers and NCOs in the Plans and Operations Division. The various increments had to be balanced between staff action personnel and support personnel. For example, there was an increment commander (one of the 261st's four colonels), a headquarters commandant or representative, a company commander or representative, a first sergeant or representative, etc. There also were personnel and administration personnel on each increment. The public affairs officer, the chaplain, and the judge advocate all had their projects.

Logistics: Messing, billeting, and supplies had to be obtained. Most of the unit personnel (up through lieutenant colonel) were housed in barracks-type quarters in the building occupied by Headquarters and Headquarters Company, US Army Support Command-Hawaii (USASCH). All utilized the HHC-USASCH dining facility in the same building. Transportation was obtained from the Fort Shafter transportation motor pool.

Air transportation to and from Hawaii was a slightly different matter. Since 1982, the 261st has found it more practical to fly the unit personnel commercial rather than requesting a flight from the Military Airlift Command. Flights for unit personnel generally are in one or two groups from the Philadelphia International Airport to Honolulu. Personnel change planes in Chicago or Los Angeles. Transportation to and from Philadelphia is by Army bus that begins or ends in Dover with stops in Wilmington and its suburbs, where many unit personnel live.

Increment commanders: In 1983 (and again in 1984), each increment had an increment commander, in each case a colonel. This individual was responsible for monitoring the progress of work on various projects, with project leaders reporting to him. With 56 projects at AT-83, this may sound like an unmanageable span of control. However, many of the projects lasted just one two-week increment—meaning that perhaps 15 or 20 projects were on-going at any one time. In addition, the commander had one or two lieutenant colonels from plans and operations branches respectively assisting with supervision.

Hand-off of projects: One of the problems anticipated and identified with the larger projects that carried over from one increment to another was the hand-off, as one group

prepared to return to Delaware just as another arrived in Hawaii. The system designed to alleviate this problem was an advance detachment, three or four individuals who arrived on Thursday prior to the actual beginning of their AT period on Saturday. This group obtained briefings on the progress and status of the various projects so its members could assist their increment's team members.

In addition, the goal was for the team leader on each project for that increment to get with his follow-on counterpart as soon as the main body arrived on a given Saturday afternoon and conduct as thorough a hand-off conference as possible in the few hours available before the departing group had to leave for Honolulu International Airport for the return to the East Coast.

(It should be noted here that the side effect of having to wait until Saturday afternoon of the second week to depart for home station, although Friday was the last duty day, was that the main body arrived back in Delaware late on Sunday afternoon in many cases. Most Guardsmen had to report for work at civilian jobs on Monday morning.)

Projects: The heart of the AT periods in 1983 and 1984 were the projects conceived, developed, and completed. The conception of the projects was a combination effort between the 261st liaison officers and the USACC-WESTCOM commander and operations officer. The most important project in 1983 was a review and rewrite of Annex K of the Pacific Theater warplan. This was dubbed "Project 1" for discussion purposes. Both the warplan and Annex K are classified, so will be discussed here only in the most general terms.

However, as Hall and Brig. Gen. Arthur V. Episcopo, 261st deputy commander, noted in their briefing at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in December 1983, addressing several thousand Signal Corps personnel at the CONTACCT conference, the plan goes beyond the everyday mission of the USACC-WESTCOM because it involves operations throughout the Pacific Theater, not merely on the Hawaiian Islands or the other Pacific islands over which WESTCOM has peacetime sway. The wartime Pacific Theater includes Korea, Japan and many other places for which planning must be done but which are either separate from WESTCOM or where there is no current US military presence.

Another major project at AT-83 was the Time Phased Force Deployment Listing (TFPDL). This is a list, which also is classified, of the various forces due to deploy to a theater in time of national emergency and the schedule for that deployment. It typically will include airlift and sealift schedules, telling a unit when and how it will deploy, such as port-call dates (aerial or sea). The 261st is interested in this plan not only because it must deploy itself, but also because it must supervise the deployment of its subordinate Signal brigades and battalions from CONUS, in some cases.





Some other projects were:

- Develop the SOP for the WESTCOM emergency operations center (C-E portion).
- Prepare TELERs (telecommunications requests) for two new fully instrumented airfields.
- Design a transportable high frequency (HF) radio system for two points (Hawaii and one other in the Pacific Theater AO).
- Develop a troposcatter/microwave communications satellite system for four islands.
- Prepare an Army communications system status reporting system for the Theater Communications Command-Army (TCCA-A) [a Signal command's mission] for the Pacific Theater (PACOM).
- Develop mobilization documents plus augmentation for military personnel in wartime.
- Research the Civilian Personnel regulation to determine the legal responsiblity of federal civil service personnel to stay in the unit (i.e., remain at work) after mobilization.

AT-84

Planning for the next year's annual training began immediately after the departure of the fourth increment in July 1983. However, by that time a new factor had been injected into the equation. Beginning in the spring of 1983, the 261st's leaders began to hear that a CAPSTONE relationship for the 261st was in the works with the newly created Third US Army. TUSA is the Army element of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF-A), and as such is the Army element of the US Central Command with a designation of ARCENT. CENTCOM, a unified command, was created January 1, 1983, to take over plans and operations functions for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asian theaters of operations. It evolved from the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), which was created by President Carter in 1979.

To better understand the injection of this additional and formidable mission, we must recall that there are only three Signal commands in the Total Army. There is the 5th Signal Command, headquartered in Worms, West Germany. It has responsibility for the European Theater from the English Channel to the Middle East. There is the 7th Signal Command at Fort Ritchie, Maryland. It has responsibility for the Western Hemisphere. Finally, there is the 261st, the only Signal command in the reserve components. Prior to the summer of 1983, the 261st's charter sometimes was described as running from the west coast of California to the east coast of Africa, covering 17 time zones and three fourths of the Earth's surface.

The formal decision by FORSCOM and the National Guard Bureau in mid-1983 to approve this additional CAPSTONE affiliation for the 261st with TUSA altered thinking in Dover. Duncan and his top leadership concluded, after meetings with the new TUSA commander and the top TUSA staff officers, that this new



AT-84

mission would have to have top priority. Unlike the Pacific Theater, the Third Army and CENTCOM were having to plan for a difficult theater from the ground up, utilizing sketchy information and in some cases virtually nonexistent troop lists. Knowledge of conditions in the Pacific Theater and warplans for its various possible AOs have been in the process of development for 40 years in some cases. Indeed, one major OPPLAN is 13 years old and undergoes only slight revisions from time to time because of the unchanging scenario and intelligence estimates.

The situation in the Southwest Asian Theater, however, is far different. Few US military forces, except the Navy in the Indiana Ocean, have operated in the area. Perhaps even more significant and degrading to efficient planning, the United States has no posts or bases in the theater and little prospect any will be obtained soon.

However, there are similarities between the Pacific and Southwest Asian Theaters. There are great unknowns in both in many areas. The chances of facing bare-based, austere communications in-country are good. Commercial communications facilities that would be available in the region vary greatly in quantity and quality, meaning that planning must begin with the extensive reliance on tactical Army C-E facilities and units.

However, the new TUSA mission did not mean the 261st would end its interest in the Pacific Theater. For one thing, the CAPSTONE relationship remains; the 261st has two CAPSTONE gaining commands now, which is not unusual. Indeed, AR 11-30 specifically mentions that two or perhaps even more CAPSTONE affiliations are possible for a Guard/Reserve unit.

So planning for AT-84 in Hawaii proceeded, but this time was geared to bringing 30-40 personnel to Hawaii rather than the 200 in four increments the previous year. Most of what turned out to be a total of 37 people went to Hawaii in early May. However, one major project that carried over from 1983 to AT-84 began in February with two- and three-man teams traveling to Fort Shafter at various intervals over a period of six months. This project was the Installation Telecommunications Plan (ITP). The 261st's Plans Division became involved with the ITP process several years ago when the unit was fostering a training relationship with the 7th Signal Command at Fort Ritchie.

The ITP is a planning technique developed by the 7th's Operations and Plans Division designed to better program and justify post, camp, and station communications assets. It is driven to a considerable extent by the Department of Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and by the justification requirements for successful procurement programming in the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Simply put, the C-E community found that many of the telecommunications requests (TELERs) it was generating

contained insufficient justification to convince the Army staff that they should have priority over such things as combat equipment.

In order to assist USACC (whose name was changed recently to US Army Information Systems Command) in justifying and defending C-E procurement, the ITP was developed as a technique for obtaining information about all fixed-station communications assets on a given Army installation, gathering operational requirements for those systems as a part of the listing of existing systems, and then engineering the technical solutions for the operational requirements in current-year dollars.

When the ITP project for Hawaii began in 1983, USACC-WESTCOM requested the 261st's ITP personnel to prepare a statement of work (SOW) for contracting out the ITP project for the Hawaiian Islands. This was done because Hall had determined that neither USACC-WESTCOM nor the Signal Battalion-Hawaii staff had sufficient personnel or could devote the time required to develop these plans.

The 261st personnel at AT-83, three men in the first increment and two in the second, did write the SOW. However, during the period it also was suggested that the 261st might send its ITP team back to Hawaii in 1984 to begin work on the required ITPs, actually nine plans because there are nine Army installations on the Hawaiian Islands. A memorandum of understanding between the 261st and USACC-WESTCOM was signed in January 1984, and work began the following month when the first two 261st staff officers arrived at Fort Shafter for the initial briefings.

The first year's work, AT-84, was to complete ITPs for Fort Shafter and Schofield Barracks. This was done in July, when the two bulging documents were turned over to Colonel Hall. He has asked the 261st for a proposal to assist with ITPs for Tripler Army Medical Center and either Pohakula Training Area or Fort DeRussey for AT-85. This, then, would leave only five smaller installations for the Signal Battalion-Hawaii personnel to do.

Results

The project technique developed between USACC-WESTCOM and the 261st Signal Command in 1983 and refined in 1984 has worked well as a method for integrating an Army National Guard unit into operations in its theater of wartime responsibility, while at the same time generating real-world warplans and work for the unit. Without the 261st's work in 1983 and 1984, the planning completed at WESTCOM simply would not have been done at all.

The same is true of the 261st's new mission with TUSA. There is no other way to do Annex K of the TUSA OPPLAN than for the 261st and its subordinate brigades to write it.

This type of project work and team approach to planning by staff members of the 261st illustrates not only the good working relationships between the active Army in Hawaii and the Delaware Guardsmen, but also the approach that General Duncan and his command group are taking with them to Third Army. The following exchange between Episcopo and Hall at the CONTACCT briefing last year sums up the lessons learned between WESTCOM and the 261st and how they apply to Third Army. Hall said:

The 261st has derived many benefits from working at WESTCOM which it will certainly carry forward to the new mission. For WESTCOM, these include knowing where the staff would work, knowing some of the people they will be working with or who will be working for them, and being knowledgeable about the systems, plans, and facilities at WESTCOM. The 261st would immediately feel right at home at Fort Shafter if it were mobilized and deployed.

Episcopo responded:

In addition, what we have learned in one theater will immediately transfer directly to another on such subjects as DCA (Defense Communications Agency) policies, TELERs, ACC regulations, status of forces agreements, contracting, host-nation support, and a whole host of other activities associated with being a member of the ACC family. This is even more important because we know how short our mobilization time is and how quickly we would deploy. That means we must be combat and operationally ready right now, even more critical a factor with our new Third Army mission.[4]

The first task, accomplished last spring, was winning approval and then selecting liaison officers from the 261st to go on active duty and move to Third Army headquarters at Fort McPherson, Georgia. Lieutenant Colonel Jon H. Ohlhaver, who had been full-time training officer for the 261st in Dover, has been selected to head that group.

The liaison team is working with the active Army C-E group at Third Army, headed by Colonel Benjamin Donaldson, in developing the planning requirements so they can be translated into projects to be assigned various staff officers. Then detailed planning can forge ahead in earnest.

Although not all Army National Guard headquarters can make a system like the one the 261st uses with its CAPSTONE affiliations work, this clearly is a system that works in this set of circumstances. Hall summed it up this way:

General Duncan and I accomplished what we set out to do to help both our organizations, and the "One Army" concept was confirmed in the best sense of the word. From the 261st's viewpoint, through fulfilling a "real-world" void by on-site work in Hawaii, it was truly able to fully grasp its new Pacific mission and take a hand in formulating the mobilization plans it might one day have to implement. Sponsoring an annual training with actual missions gave the Guard's members a taste of the active Army and provided a true sense of accomplishment.

Advantages to both organizations included the opportunity to share various management techniques and perhaps learn better processes from each other, as we served side by side in an integrated staff. Finally, important benefits accrued to USACC-WESTCOM itself, with development of our contingency plans, and we now find ourselves better prepared to assume our wartime role.[5]

ENDNOTES

1. The reserve components of the Army are the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve.

2. AR 11-30, para i.

3. Hall, Dennis C., "One Army—One Way," **SIGNAL Magazine,** *February 1984.*

4. Briefing, "CONTACCT" Conference, US Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon, Fort Gordon, Georgia, December 1983, by then-Colonel(P) Arthur V. Episcopo, 261st Signal Command deputy commander, and Colonel Dennis C. Hall, commander of USACC-WESTCOM.

5. Ibid.

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